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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
MARIE E. PETERSON,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
\VESTERN CASUALTY AND
SURETY COMPANY,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No.
10,524

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF CASE
Plaintiff's Complaint ( R. 1-2) sets out two
causes of action against the defendant. The first
cause of action was in the nature of a garnishment
action whereby the plaintiff sought to recover from
the defendant the policy amount ($10,000.00) on
the Judgment awarded to the plaintiff in a previous action against the defendant's policyholder,
Chuck Shim Lew. The second cause of action was
in the nature of a tort action whereby the plaintiff sought to recover from the defendant an additional $2,500.00 over the policy limits, claiming
that the defendant was guilty of bad faith in only
offering the sum of $6,000.00 to settle the plaintiff's claim.
1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On Cross Motions For Summary Judgment
made at the time of the pre-trial of this action, the
trial court granted plaintiff's Motion as to the first
cause of action and dismissed the plaintiff's second
cause of action.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant and appellant seeks a reversal of
the summary judgment granted to the plaintiff on
her first cause of action and seeks entry of a summary judgment in favor of the defendant and appellant. In the event this court sees fit to affirm the
holding of the trial court, defendant and appellant
seeks a modification of the judgment entered in
favor of the plaintiff and respondent to eliminate
or correct the interest awarded to the plaintiff by
said judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The record in this case consists of the pleadings, Motions, Order and Judgment filed in this
action, the pleadings, Motions, Orders and J udgments in the action brought by Marie E. Peterson
against Chuck Shim Lew, Civil No. 143,286 in the
District. Court of Salt Lake County and a number
of Exhibits, including two depositions (Exhibits
D-10 and D-11). The facts, as established by the
pleadings and Exhibits contained in the record before this court, are the following:
On February 24, 1963 at approximately 2 :23
2

o'clock A.M. the plaintiff was riding as a guest
in a car driven by Dennis H. McMillan, which car
collided with a vehicle driven by the defendant's
insured, Chuck Shim Lew. The collision occurred
in the intersection of 900 East and 2700 South in
Salt Lake City, which intersection is protected by
a traffic semaphore showing green, yellow and red.
The right front portion of McMillan's car collided
with the left front door area of Chuck Shim Lew's
vehicle (D-11, page 13). McMillan said the light
was green in his favor as he approached, but that
it turned to amber as he was in the intersection
(D-11, page 15). Mr. Lew testified at a subsequent
hearing in regard to a citation issued to McMillan
that he (Lew) had the green light and that McMillan had gone through a red light (D-11, page
22). No eye witnesses were known (D-10, page 19)
except the two drivers and the plaintiff, Marie E.
Peterson.
Suit was filed on May 23, 1963 by plaintiff
against Chuck Shim Lew. In the Answer to the
Complaint filed on his behalf by the insurer, Western Casualty And Sm·ety Company (hereinafter
referred to as Wes tern), Chuck Shim Lew denied
any negligence or misconduct and alleged as an
affirmative defense that plaintiff could not recover
against defendant because the negligence of McMillan was the sole proximate cause of the accident
and the resulting injuries, if any, which she sustained.
3

On July 25, 1963 counsel for Western mailed
a letter (Ex. D-3) to Lew at his Salt Lake City
address of 838 Jefferson Street, notifying him of its
entrance into the case and advising him to notify
Western or counsel of any change of address he
might make since it may be necessary to contact
him on short notice. The letter was returned, undelivered.
On August 19, 1963 counsel mailed a request
to Western and an independent adjuster for assistance in locating Mr. Lew. Counsel was advised
orally that Lew was residing at 301 Boyle Avenue,
Los Angeles, California (Ex. D-2, pp 2-3). Pursuant to this information counsel wrote a letter (Ex.
D-4) on September 6, 1963 informing Lew that a
complaint had been filed against him asking
$32,154.95 in damages. In the letter he was requested to keep counsel advised of his whereabouts, and
to inform them of any change of address since it
may be necessary to contact him on short notice
(Ex. D-5).
Mr. Lew replied by letter on September 19,
1963 in which he said:
~'Dear

Mr. Hanson,

"I had receive your carbon copy yesterday, and I wish to thank you for notifying
me.
"At the present, I am working in Riverside, California. I wish to know if I have to
4

appear in court with you and the date to
appear in court.
"My present address is % Chungking
Rest., 3817 Market St., Riverside, California.
The telephone number is Ov-6-7292. You could
notify me at this address.
"Again, I wish to express my thanks to
you.
"Truly Yours,
"Chuck Shim Lew"
In reply to this letter counsel on September 23, 1963
wrote to Mr. Lew:
"We are in l'eceipt of your letter of September 19, 1963. We will advise you when it
is necessary for you to appear in court or of
any other action which you might be required
to take in connection with this case. Kindly
keep us advised of your whereabouts so that
we might either write you or telephone you
on short notice." (Ex. D-6)
This letter was never returned and is thus presumed to have been delivered.
On February 4, 1964 the case was set for trial
on March 12, 1964. In a letter dated February 7,
1964 counsel wrote to Lew at the California address
given by Lew, advising him of the trial setting and
asking that he be in Salt Lake City not later than
March 12, 1964. A copy of that letter was sent to
Lew's Salt Lake address. The letter sent to California was returned with a notation indicating that
Lew no longer lived at that address.
5

Upon return of that letter counsel once again
contacted \Vestern for assistance. \Vestern refened
counsel to Mr. Herbert C. Papenfuss, an agent for
Monarch Underwriters who had sold Mr. Lew his
policy and also loaned him money. Counsel was informed that Mr. Papenfuss had made an investigation by going to California in October of 1963 to
try to locate this defendant. He interviewed various
people in several restaurants, by whom he was informed that Lew had left California and had probably gone to Vancouver, Canada. He learned nothing more until January, 1964 when he received a
remittance from Lew who gave his address as Club
13 Cafe, Bienfait, Saskatchewan, Canada. He telephoned the Club 13, but was told that Lew had left
and might be in Florida, either in Miami or Miami
Beach.
Upon the basis of the information received
from Papenfuss counsel moved the court on March
4, 1964 for a continuance of the trial of the action
brought by Marie E. Peterson against Chuck Shim
Lew in order that additional efforts could be made
to locate Lew in Florida. The motion was resisted
by the plaintiff, Marie E. Peterson, and was heard
and denied on March 6, 1964. On that same day
counsel. filed an Offer Of Judgment for $6,000.00,
the amount he had previously offered plaintiff's
counsel verbally, pursuant to Rule 68 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. He also mailed a letter
(Ex. D-8) to Lew notifying him of counsel's with6

drawal and the denial of coverage due to his noncooperation. Copies of that letter were sent to Lew's
former address in Salt Lake City; Riverside, California; and Bienfait, Saskatchewan. All were returned, undelivered. On March 10, 1964 counsel filed
Notice of Withdrawal and Notice To Appoint Other
Counsel (Ex. D-9) and copies of these were mailed
to the above mentioned addresses. Again they were
returned, undelivered.
The case proceeded to trial with the plaintiff
recovering a default Judgment against Chuck Shim
Lew for $12,500.00.
On March 4, 1965 the present action was instituted against Western. Plaintiff alleged two causes
of action. In the first cause of action she sought
to recover the $10,000.00 policy limits. In the second
she prayed for $2,500.00 on the ground that Western acted in bad faith in not settling the action
within the policy limits (R. 1-4).
The cause came up for pre-trial and the hearing of Motions by both parties for summary judgment before the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson on
October 7, 1965 (R. 40). The defendant, Western,
in support of its Motion For Summary Judgment
offered in evidence the insurance contract (Ex.
D-1) , the transcript of the proceedings for a continuance of the trial in the prior case (Ex. D-2),
the letters sent to Lew and the letter received from
Lew (Exs. D 3-8), the depositions of Marie E.
7

Peterson and Dennis McMillan ( Exs. D 10-11) and
the file of the prior action against Chuck Shim Lew.
In support of her Motion For Summary Judgment, the plaintiff offered no evidence or affidavits,
but stood upon the pleadings.
On December 9, 1965 the court granted the
plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment as to
the first cause of action and dismissed the second
cause of action. In its Memorandum Decision the
court stated ( R. 52) :
"In so finding the Court is of the opinion
that this is even a more flagrant case of using
a reasonable effort by the insurance company
than that found in 5 Utah 2d. at Page 15. It
appears that the defendant has agents in
various parts of the country who were able
at least to determine the addresses of the
insured, and they apparently left the matter
of attempting to find the insured entirely to
the Utah attorneys, which does not appear, to
this Court, to be a reasonable effort."
The court did not enumerate the reasons for
its decision dismissing the second cause of action,
the action praying for $2,500.00 because of the alleged bad faith of the defendant, Western. We assume it. was in response to the Motion of counsel
for defendant made at the time of the pre-trial in
the fallowing words :
" . . . I include in this motion all the
grounds stated in the motion for summary
judgment, and now as a basis for the grounds
8

stated in the motion fo1· summary judgment
the stipulations, the exhibits and the depositions and the record of the prior case. In
addition thereto I move specifically for a dismissal of the second cause of action, asking
for a judgment in excess of policy limits of
$2,500.00, on the grounds that the Utah Supreme Court has specifically held in one case
that a motion to recover an excess over the
insurance policy cannot be joined with a garnishment action against the insurance company to recover the amount of a judgment
recovered against the insured." (R. 49)
The case which counsel had in mind was Paul v.
Kirkendall, 6 Utah (2d) 256, 311 Pac. (2d) 376,
in which it was held that a judgment debtor's tort
claim against the garnishee cannot be adjudicated
in garnishment proceedings brought by the judgment holder.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING
AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT THE DEFENSE OF
NON-COOPERATION HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED AND
THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED THEREFORE TO A SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

The paramount issue in this case is whether
the record supports the actions of the trial court
in denying defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment and in granting plaintiff's Motion. It is the
appellant's contention here that the facts within
the record clearly shows: The insured acted wilfully and unreasonably in secreting himself by not
9

providing forwarding adch·esses and other essential
information which the insurer had requested from
him in order that he could be contacted for assistance in the preparation and trial of the action;
that the insurer, Western, was diligent in its search
for Lew; and that the absence of the insured, he
being the sole witness capable of establishing the
defendant's affirmative defense, was prirna facie
prejudicial to the insurer in its defense of the action
against the insured.
This court has on two prior occasions dealt
with non-cooperation cases. However, the situations
in those two cases are readily distinguished from
the present case.

In Oberhansley v. Traveler's Insitrance C01npany, 5 Utah (2d) 15, 295 Pac. (2d) 1093 (1956)
the court affirmed a trial court's verdict for the
plaintiff. The basis for the court's decision was the
fact that the insured had not hidden himself from
the insurer, but had notified the insured well in
advance of the trial that he would not attend due
to the danger of losing his newly acquired employment and a prospective promotion. The issue there
was resolved in favor of the plaintiff on the ground
that the insurer knew where the insured was, knew
he was not corning to the trial and failed to preserve his testimony by taking his deposition. The
court there was not concerned with the reasonableness of the insurer's efforts to find the insured,
since the whereabouts of the insured was known.
10

Instead, the court held that the insured had a justifiable excuse for not attending the trial, and that
the insurance company could rrot claim to have been
prejudiced by his absence since the company failed
to take reasonable efforts to preserve his testimony
after learning that he would not be at the trial. The
issue in the present case is whether the defendant
made diligent efforts to locate the insured - an
issue not before the court in Oberhansley v. Traveler's, supra.
In the recent case of Montgo11iery v. Preferred
Risk Mutual Insurance C01npany, Docket No. 10,278,
the court was once again faced with the question of
whether the insurer could establish prejudice by the
insured's non-attendance at the trial. The court
held that the insurer could have used the deposition
taken previously by the plaintiff and that insurer
was, therefore, not prejudiced in the defense. The
court also said that had the insured's presence been
necessary the insurer did not act diligently in locating him, as indicated by the fact that the first letter
ti-acing the deposition (which had never been returned by the insured) was mailed five years after
the accident. The court also noted that the insured
had a criminal charge pending against him, was unemployed and had recently been divorced, all of
which should have put insurer on notice that the
insured might not be present at the trial. However,
the apparent concern of the court was over the
failure to get the deposition of the insured while
11

he was still available - and not whether the search
for him after he became unavailable was sufficient
The facts of that case present a situation where the
insurer failed on all three requirements of the defense, i.e. to show that it was prejudiced by the nonattendance, that it had acted diligently to overcome the prejudice and that it had made a diligent
effort to locate the insured.
The case at bar presents only one of these three
issues - whether diligent efforts to find the insured were made by the insurer. This was pointed
out by the trial court in its Memorandum Decision
in which it concludes that the insurer was not reasonably diligent in its efforts to locate the insured.
The trial court apparently did not take issue with
the fact that the non-attendance of the insured
worked a prejudice to the insurer's case and that
the failure of the insurer to take the insured's
deposition was reasonable up until the time it was
informed by the return of the February 7, 1964
letter that Lew had moved without leaving a forwarding address and without notifying Western
as he had agreed to do.
There can be no serious dispute as to the prejudicial effect of Lew's absence at the trial. He was
the only one who could testify in support of the
affirmative defense. The deposition of Dennis McMillan indicates that Lew's testimony in the citation hearing was that McMillan had run the reel
light and that Lew had the green light. It is obvious
12

that the issue of liability in that case hinged upon
the sole question of who had the right of way in
the intersection at the time of the accident, to which
issue Lew's testimony was essential. His disappearance left Western without a defendant and without
a defense.
There also is no serious dispute as to whether
Western acted reasonably up to the time that notice
was received of Lew's disappearance. The letter
which Western received from Lew on September 19,
1963 is self evidence of the assurance given by Lew
that he would be available for trial. Had he stated
that he could not attend the trial here in Utah or
had he in some other manner cast doubt upon his
attendance the situation here would be different,
thus similar to the Oberhansley situation. But, instead, he indicated interest in the case and the tenor
of his letter pledges cooperation in the disposition
of the action.
It should not be forgotten that the primary duty

in such situation is on the insured, for he is under
a contractual duty to make himself available for the
trial. In the Oberhansley case the court recognized
that an unreasonable failure by the witness- insured,
if material, to attend the trial is a breach of the
cooperation clause of the liability policy. Thus, in
any consideration of whether the non-cooperation
defense has been established the essential factor is
whether there is any evidence indicating that the
insurd's failure to attend was excused or justifiable.
13

There was such evidence in the Obalwnsley case,
but none in the present case.
In many states the absence from trial is all
that is required to sustain the non-cooperation defense. See 60 A.L.R. (2d) 1050. It is apparent, however, that in Utah to enforce that duty the insurer
must also act reasonably in obtaining the insured's
cooperation - but that is not to say that the insurer need go to the expense of getting depositions
from its insureds who are informed of their duty
and who express willingness to perform it. It would
be grossly unfair and contrary to the parties own
contract to impress upon the insurer the duty to
act as a nursemaid to its insureds who from all
appearances are willing to cooperate in the defense
and appear at the trial. It was the recognition of
this rule by the trial court in the original case which
made it necessary for Western to withdraw from
the defense of that action. Wes tern moved for a
continuance when it learned that Lew had left Bienfait, Canada without leaving a forwarding address,
so that it might continue its efforts to locate Lew
in Florida. The court denied the Motion, and in
doing so made the following observation:
'"Well, I will show that by saying that
when a witness is playing hard to get and
trying to hide from you, I am more inclined
to help you find him; but where a party hin:self gives the runaround to counsel that this
defendant has seemed to give, I don't feel
quite so sympathetic towards him. I think he
14

owes a duty to the court to he ready when
the court is ready for trial, and I believe he's
had. ample notice and ample opportunity to
be found if he wanted to be found, so the
motion will be denied.'' (Ex. D-2, p. 5)
It is clearly indisputable that the defendant
did all that could be reasonably expected up to the
time of notice that Lew had left his California
address. It is further the contention of the defendant
that as a matter of law Wes tern acted with reasonable diligence in trying to locate the insured from
February 4th until the time of withdrawal on March
7th. This is not a situation as in the Montgomery
case, where there was a three year period of disappearance and only feeble if not non-existent attempts to locate the insured by a letter seeking to
get the deposition back. In the present case Western
had notice on February 7, 1964 that the insured
had left California without giving forwarding information to the insurer. During the next month
registered letters were sent to all known addresses
and information was sought from other sources such
as the agent who sold the insurance policy. He reported a personal investigation in California which
showed that Lew had left California for Canada
or Washington. He had also received correspondence
from Lew at the Bienfait, Saskatchewan address,
but when he telephoned the address he was told that
Lew was probably somewhere in Florida. Upon
receipt of this information Western moved for a
continuance in .order to make an investigation in
15

Florida, but the motion was denied. Western had
less than a month to locate Lew, who was "probably in Florida somewhere". Within that short
period Wes tern did all that could be reasonably expected under the circumstances.
It is unrealistic, if not impossible, to set up a

pervasive rule as to what efforts should be taken
by an insurance company in all situations of lost
insureds. There are several things an insurance
company could possibly do to locate the insured,
given time, but the law only requires reasonable
diligence under the particular circumstances. If this
were not so the cooperation clause of the policy would
be nullified and the insurer would often find itself
defending cases without the essential testimony of
the insured, as in the present case. The insurance
contract involved here makes compliance with the
cooperation clause a condition precedent to coverage,
not merely a covenant to cooperate.
"Conditions
"4. ASSISTANCE AND COOPERATION
OF THE INSURED - COVERAGES A, B,
D, E, F, G, H, I, J AND K: The insured shall
cooperate with The Western and, upon The
· Western's request, attend hearings and trials
and assist in making settlements, securing
and giving evidence, obtaining the attendance
of witnesses and in the conduct of any legal
proceedings in connection with the subject
matter of this insurance. The insured shall
not, except at his own cost, voluntarily make
any payment, assume any obligation or inlG

cur any expense other than for such first aid
to others as shall be imperative at the time of
accident.
"8. ACTION AGAINST THE WESTERN
-COVERAGES A, B, C AND K: No action
shall lie against The Western unless as a condition precedent thereto, the insJred shall
have fully complied with all the terms of this
. . . ."
po1icy
Thus, once the insurer establishes that the insured
did not attend the trial, that his absence was prejudicial to insurer's defense and that a reasonable
effort had been made to locate him such defense
demands as a matter of law that the insurer be
relieved of liability under the policy.
There are numerous cases which hold that efforts similar to those made in the present situation
are as a matter of law reasonably diligent efforts.
In Pawlik v. State Farm, Mutual Autonwbile
Insurance Co., 302 Fed. (2d) 255 (CA 7th 1962)
the trial court found as a matter of law that the
defendant insurer had shown a breach of the cooperation clause. There the accident occurred in November, 1956. The insured went to Virginia to live,
but he informed the insurer that he would return
If needed. In September of 1957 suit was filed on
the accident. On August 20, 1958 the insured received a letter giving notice to him that the trial
was set for October 20, 1958. A second letter was
received by him on October 2, 1958 advising him
to attend. He did not appear and the insurer with17

drew. The court sustained the trial court's finding as a matter of law that the affirmative defense
had been established and that the plaintiff had not
fulfilled its burden of refuting the defense.
A case very similar to the present situation
is Rohlf v. Great Anierican Mutual lndeinnity Co.,
161 N.E. 232, 27 Ohio App. 208 (1927). The accident occurred on August 6, 1922. Suit was brought
19 months later. The insurer attempted to find the
insured in four different cities, and finally found
him in Toledo on February 4, 1925. The insured
at that time made a written statement in which he
denied any negligence, and put the blame on the
driver of plaintiff's car for driving on the wrong
side of the road. On February 16, 1925 a letter was
sent to the insured at the Toledo address, advising
him to appear at the trial. He made no response
to the letter and did not attend the trial. The court
affirmed the trial court's finding that the defense
of non-cooperation had been established. In doing
so the court put great weight on the fact that the
insured had told the insurer that he would keep it
advised of any change of address, "but that he had
not given the company any notice of his change of
addre~s and receipt for the registered letters had
been returned to the company, signed by his representatives at the Toledo address".
In Cooper v. Employers Mutual Liability Insurance C01npany of Wisconsin, 103 S.E. (2d) 210,
199 Va. 908 (1958) the accident was reported in
18

July, 1955. The insured gave an address where he
could be located. A week later he gave a written
statement to the insurer, with the same address
indicated. The Complaint was served on the insured
at his address on August 12, 1955. Shortly thereafter the insurer tried to locate the insured at the
address but learned that he had quit his job and
had moved. His employer gave his last known address as being Alberta, Virginia. On October 31,
1955 the insurer wrote to the insured, reminding
him of his duty to cooperate, which letter was sent
"return receipt requested" to his last three known
addresses. No response was received. On November
14, 1955 the insurer denied coverage but remained
in the suit under a Reservation Of Rights, notice
of which was mailed to the above addresses. On
November 30, 1955 a letter was mailed to the insured again advising him of his duties and of the
coming trial date. The letter was returned, unanswered. Upon the trial a judgment was recovered
by the plaintiff. In the subsequent garnishment suit
the trial court struck all of the plaintiff's evidence
at the conclusion of his case. The court affirmed
it, holding that as a matter of law the efforts of the
insurer in sending letters to all known addresses of
the insured and contacting his former employer
were all a reasonably prudent person could be expected to do. The court said:
" ... When he moved from 3730 Delmont
Street, the address given in his accident re19

port, to 2811 Hanes Avenue he did not notify
the company of his change of address and
left no forwarding address. Likewise when he
moved from Hanes Avenue to Alberta he failed to notify the company and left no forwarding address. The latter address was secured
from his former employer. One of the two
letters delivered to that address, signed for
by Wynn, was not returned, but the other
was returned unopened. Whether Trayham
actually received the letter not returned is
not shown by the record. He failed to contact
the company at any time after he made his
report of the accident on July 12, 1955. He
did not assist in any manner in the preparation for trial nor did he appear at the trial.
These facts and circumstances constituted a
wilful lack of cooperation with the company
and such lack of cooperation was substantial
and material and was prejudicial to defendan t ... especially in view of the fact that his
report of the accident filed with the company
indicated a defense to the action." (Page
215)
And in Eakle v. Hayes, 55 Pac. (2d) 1072
(Wash. 1936) the accident occurred on February
5, 1932. The suit was filed in December, 1932 and
in November of 1933 the trial date was set for
March 27, 1934. The insurer tried to locate the insured at his residence in Seattle but its efforts
failed. Relatives didn't know where he was either.
The insurer sent letters to all known addresses,
which letters were all returned. The insurer then
learned that the insured had left Seattle and had
gone east. Through another source of information
:20
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it was learned that the insured had been seen in
Charleston, Mass. on February 7, 1934, but efforts
to trace him from there were unsuccessful. In reference to the efforts to find the insured by mailing letters to all known addresses, the court said
on page 1074
" . . . there was nothing more that respondent could have done under the circumstances ... "
In Grady v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company, 264 Fed. (2d) 519 (CA 4th 1959)
the accident occurred on July 19, 1955 and the insured subsequently forwarded the suit papers to
the insurer. At that time the insurer notified the
insured to advise its attorneys of any change of
address. On October 20, 1955 a letter was mailed
to the insured at his previous address, but the letter
was returned undelivered. The insurer then made
inquiry at the address and at the insured's previous
place of employment, learning only that the insured had left with no forwarding address given.
On October 28, 1955 the insurer, having learned
that the insured might have moved to El Centro,
California, wrote a letter to that address, requesting the insured to make immediate contact with the
insurer. No answer was received. Again on November 8, 1955 the insurer wrote a letter, with copies
going to the El Centro address, the Virginia address
and to the insured's previous employer in Virginia.
No response was ever received. The insurer then
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withdrew from the case. The coul't affirmed the
trial court's dismissal of the complaint against the
insurer on the ground that there was no genuine
issue as to whether the non-cooperation defense had
been established.
In Polito v. Galluzzo, 149 N.E. (2d) 375, Mass.
(1958) the accident occurred on May 1, 1953. A
statement was taken from the insured on July 6,
1953 and the suit was filed September 30, 1953. On
October 5, 1955 a registered letter was mailed to the
insured advising him of the coming trial. The letter
was returned, undelivered. An investigator who went
to the address could not find him either. A constable with a subpoena also could not find him. In
the garnishment action the trial court dismissed the
complaint. In affirming the trial court, the court
made this observation which she<ls light on the
present case:
"The claim here is that the disappearance of the insured without notifying the insurer of his new add1·ess or furnishing some
method by which he could be reached, constitutes a lack of cooperation and justifies the
insurer in disclaiming liability after it has
failed by reasonable methods to secure the
attendance of the insured as a witness at the
trial. So far as appears the insurer had no
other available witness on the question of
liability. The last communication the company
had from Galluzzo was in July, 1959. So far
as the insurance conipany ioas concerned he
virtually disappeared. Here the company had
made reasonable efforts to locate him. We
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think that the disappearance of the insured
and his failure to notify the insurer of the
change of address were a material breach
of the cooperation clause in the policy and
warranted a disclaimer." (Page 377)
And in Pot01nac Insurance Company v. Stanley, 281 Fed. (2d) 775 (CA 7th 1960) the insurer
brought a declaratory judgment action for a determination of its non-cooperation defense. The district court granted summary judgment to the insurer. The accident occurred in March of 1957. The
affidavits of the insurer indicated that a series of
nine letters, beginning in September, 1957, were
mailed to the insured and copies to members of his
family. He moved several times and each time failed
to notify the insurer of his address. The insurer
enlisted the services of a credit agency, which failed
to locate him. The court affirmed the summary
judgment, holding that it was not debatable that
the insurer had shown due diligence.
And in Indeninity Insurance Company of North
Arnerica v. Smith, 78 A. (2d) 461, Md. (1951) the
insureds knew of the necessity of their presence at
the trial. One week before trial the insurer attempted to contact them and learned they had moved
without leaving a new address. A continuance was
granted and registered letters were sent to all known
addresses, but to no avail. Subpoenaes were also
issued, but returned unserved. Inquiry was made of
the insureds' relatives and neighbors. In the trial
court the verdict was in favor of the plaintiff, but
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the appellate court reversed and granted a directed
verdict to the insurer on the ground that as a matter
of law the insureds had breached the policy and
the insurer had made reasonable efforts to locate
them.
The point of the above cases is that the efforts
to be made by the insurer depend upon the time
available and the information available to the insurer about the insured's whereabouts. The appellant is unable to see how the efforts taken by it
and its counsel after learning of Lew's disappearance are anything but a reasonable effort. Just
as in some of the above cited cases, the defendant
Western did not even know for sure what state
or city the insured was in. Therefore, in absence of
such information the insurer's only method short
of a full scale national search was to send out
letters to known addresses of Lew's residences and
employment in hopes of obtaining information as
to his new address. It would appear to be a misconception of the relationship between the insurer and
the insured to hold that the insured, with full knowledge of his duty to cooperate, could wilfully secrete
himself by moving around from state to state and
from country to country and yet still demand coverage beGause the insurance company did not employ
every conceivable means of locating him regardless
of the expense and time involved. The insured not
only made such moves but also did it with full
knowledge that he had promised to keep the insur24

ance company advised of his whereabouts and he
obviously knew that the insurance company was
relying upon that promise.
This obviously is not a case where the insurer
was encouraging the insured to "stay lost" so that
the former could withdraw. The insurer, with Lew's
cooperation, had a defense to the original action.
The record shows that the usual pre-trial procedures were fallowed by Western in preparing the
defense, and that depositions of the plaintiff and
and Dennis McMillan were taken. And in addition, Western made a good faith offer of settlement even after it knew of Lew's disappearance.
The judge of the trial court in the first action was
of the opinion that the i'nsured was giving the insurer the "runaround" and, therefore, he (the insured) would get no sympathy from the court.
Consequently the insurer was caught in the middle
of the proverbial "squeeze play" - the continuance
was not granted since the court was of the opinion
that the insured had breached its contract, but in the
subsequent action the insurer is held liable because
it did not make sufficient efforts to find the insured, seemingly without any regard by that court
to the lack of opportunity caused by the denial of
the continuance.
Appellant believes it is clear that the trial
court erred in not granting defendant's Motion For
Summary Judgment; that the evidence submitted,
all by the defendant, establishes without any genu25

ine issue of material fact the defense of non-cooperation; and since no evidence of excuse or justification was offered by the plaintiff a summary judgment for the defendant was necessary.
POINT II.
THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN
TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE OF EVIDENCE NOT IN
THE RECORD, WHICH EVIDENCE IS NOT AMENABLE TO JUDICIAL NOTICE.

The Memorandum Decision makes it clear that
the trial court below, in granting the summary
judgment for the plaintiff, took judicial notice of
the fact that Western "has agents in various parts
of the country who were able at least to determine
the addresses of the insured". The court gives no
other reason for holding that the defendant's efforts were not reasonable. What the court in effect
did was make an assumption of fact not warranted
by the record. There is no evidence in this record
where Western may or may not have agents, and
particularly not in the State of Florida. Such evidence, if it existed, should have been presented by
the plain tiff to show that the efforts were not
reasonable. But there was no such evidence presented at any stage of either proceeding.
It ·is a cardinal principle accepted without dispute that a court may take judicial notice only of
facts which are matters of common knowledge,
which are well and authoritatively settled and not
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doubtful or uncertain and which must be known to
be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court,
20 Am. Jur., Evidence, Section 17. It is obvious
that the particular whereabouts of defendant's
agents, assumed in this case by the court, are not
of such a class of facts as is amenable to judicial
notice. If this method of fact finding were permissible the courts would be granting summary judgments based upon their own assumptions of the
facts, thus depriving the parties of the effect of
evidence they have submitted and depriving them
of a fair determination of the issues based only
on the record presented. See an analagous situation
in JV!almberg v. Baugh, 62 Utah 331, 218 Pac. 975.
It is obvious that the court erred in assuming
such critical facts, and that such error calls for a
reversal of the summary judgment granted to the
plaintiff.
POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS ASSESSMENT OF
INTEREST AGAINST THE DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

There is yet another matter in which the court
erred in this action, and that is in its assessment
of interest on the Judgment which the court gave
to the plaintiff on her first cause of action. Of
course, if this court agrees with the defendant and
appellant that the trial court erred in granting
plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment or in
failing to grant the defendant's Motion For Sum27

mary Judgment this point becomes moot. It is only
applicable should this court decide that the trial
court did not err in granting plaintiff's Motion For
Summary Judgment.
By the plaintiff's Amended Complaint, plaintiff in her first cause of action prays judgment "'on
the first cause of action against defendant for the
sum of $10,000.00, interest from the date of said
judgment at the rate of 8 % per annum, costs of
that action and costs of this action" ( R. 4). There
were no amendments to this prayer, yet the court
in its Judgment entered herein (R. 53) purported
to give the plaintiff interest on the Judgment in
the Marie E. Peterson v. Chuck Shim Lew case,
or interest on $12,500.00, rather than on $10,000.00,
the amount of interest awarded being $1,880.00.
This would appear to be error in a number of respects.
First of all, even if we consider the amount to
be $12,500.00, the interest has been incorrectly
computed.
Secondly, the award of interest would appear
to be beyond the prayer of the Amended Complaint
since the plaintiff simply prays for judgment on
the fitst cause of action against the defendant for
$10,000.00 and for interest on her $10,000.00 Judgment at the rate of eight percent per annum. We
submit this is a fair construction of the plaintiff's
prayer and if submitted and if the Judgment of
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the trial court is otherwise affirmed would mean
that the plaintiff would be entitled to a Judgment
of $10,000.00 plus interest on said sum at the rate
of eight percent per annum from the date of entry
thereof, which in this instance is December 13,
1965. Were we to assume that the prayer of plaintiff's Amended Complaint as set out above referred
to the Judgment in the Peterson v. Lew case (which
it does not) rather than to the Judgment in this
case and that the defendant and appellant Western
had a duty upon the rendition of the Judgment in
the Peterson v. Lew case to pay its policy limits
on said Judgment for the reason that its insured,
Chuck Shim Lew, was not guilty of violation of the
cooperative clause of his policy, assessment of interest on the $12,500.00 figure would appear to be
error. Under such a view the most that can be said
is that Western would be liable for interest on that
portion of the Judgment which it should have paid,
or for interest on $10,000.00.
It should be kept in mind that this is not a
case where the insurer has appealed or otherwise
prevented execution or collection of a judgment
for its own purposes while it sought a reversal of
the Judgment entered against its insured. In an
action brought by its own insured against the insurer, upon a determination of the issues against
the insurer, the insured would at the most only have
been entitled to collect damages to the extent that
he was damaged by the insurer's breach of contract,
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which would include the amount the insurer should
have paid plus interest on said amount. The policy
of the defendant and appellant contains what is
termed the ·"Standard Interest Clause" (see Ex.
D-1) which reads as follows:
"II. SUPPLEMENTARY PAYMENTS:
... The Western agrees to pay, in addition
to the applicable limits of liability:
" (a) all expenses incurred by The Wes tern,
all costs taxed against the insured in any
such suit and all interest on the entire amount
of any judgment therein which accrues after
entry of the judgment and before The Western has paid or tendered or deposited in court
that part of the judgment which does not
exceed the limit of The Western's liability
thereon·"
'
It would be an inequitable result to put the
burden upon the insurer to pay interest accruing
on the debt of the insured. The courts have recognized the inconsistency of holding the insurer liable
for interest on money which the insured is obligated to pay but has not paid, and thus subject to
his beneficial use. In the landmark case of Smnpson
v. Century Inde11inity Co., 8 Cal. (2d) 476, 66 P.
(2d) 434 (1937) the verdict was greatly in excess,
and an appeal was taken from that verdict and
was affirmed. The policy contained the standard
interest clause. The question there explored is the
same as is presented here, what is meant by the
words "all interest accrumg after entry of judg30

ment"? The court said the meaning of the words
is shown by two considerations:
1. Reading the words in context with the
rest of the policy clearly indicates that the
interest is limited, as is the liability. The court
said
"It hardly seems probable, therefore, that the
parties to the policy of insurance, after expressly limiting the liability of the company
to the principal sum of $10,000, intended to
make it liable for interest on any greater
amount.... " (Page 436)
2. Since the insured could lose nothing
by the appeal period, there clearly was no intent to compensate him for loss not suffered.
The court argued that the insured had the use
of the money during the appeal period. Therefore, since interest is merely the value set for
the use of money, the insured lost nothing. The
court referred to a previous case of Maryland
Casualty Co. v. Omaha Electric L. & P. Co.,
157 F. 514, 519 ( CCA 8th 1907), where the
court said it was a specious argument to say
that the appeal by the insurer injured the insured. The court said :
"The assured stood after paying the interest
exactly as it would have stood if it had paid
the judgment of $5,000 on Jan. 3, 1902, when
originally rendered. Nothing was lost by the
appeal as the interest ultimately paid was
neutralized by the use and enjoyment of the
money before that time."
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In the Sampson case the coul't thus held that
the words "all interest" meant all the interest accruing on the judgment only up to the policy limits.
And in a more recent case a third reason for
not holding the insurer liable was espoused. In
Standard Accident Insurance Co. v. Winget, 197
F. (2d) 97 (CCA 9th, Cal. 1952) the standard interest clause was again involved. The court said
"If we hold an insurer liable for interest, not
on the portion of the judgment for which it
is liable, which it does not pay, but on the
whole amount recovered against the insured,
we are imposing vicarious liability ... And
a contract should not be interpreted in such
a manner as to impose upon a person responsibility for the obligation of others, even if it
be in the form of interest only." (Page 107)

The court then quoted from Malnigren v. Southwestern Auto Ins. Co., 126 Cal. App. 135, 14 P. (2d)
351,352 (1932)
"The only logical construction to place upon
the word interest as used in the above mentioned policy, is that it referred only to interest accruing on the principal sum of a
judgment for which respondent (insurer)
was liable under the terms of the policy ... "
(Page 107)
The court compared the Mal1ngren rule and the
theory of the insured.
"'This interpretation commends itself to reason. The interpretation which the trial court
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rejected would penalize the insurance company for exercising the right, or encouraging the insured, to appeal." (Page 107)
There have been numerous cases since the
Sampson case which have held that the Standard
Interest Clause limits liability on interest just as
the total liability is limited. In Morgan v. Graham,
228 F. (2d) 625 (CA 10 Okla. 1956) the court
followed the Sampson and Standard Accident cases
in holding "all interest" as meaning only the interest
on the policy limit. The Morgan case was followed by
two later cases: Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Indemnity Insurance Co., 260 F. (2d) 361 (CA 10 Colo.
1958); and Herzog v. Fidelity And Casualty Co.,
257 F. (2d) 840(CA10 Okla. 1958).
The New York rule is clearly that of limited
liability for interest. It was first espoused in Devlin
v. New York Mutual Casualty Taxicab Insurance
Asso., 213 App. Div. 152, 210 N.Y.S. 57 (1925).
And in Home Indemnity Co. v. Corie, 206 Misc. 720,
134 N.Y.S. (2d) 443, 446 (1954) the court said:
"When the nature of interest, compensation
for the use or detention of money is born in
mind, the result reached is far more reasonable than that sought by the defendants (the
insured). Since the limit of the plaintiff:s
liability on the judgments themselves is
$10 000, this is the sum of money for whose
use 'it should pay ... The insured's surrender
of control of the action, incidental to the insurance, does not justify the impositi~n of
liability for interest on the part of the Judgment which it is in no event bound to pay ... "
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The H01ne lndeninity case was then followed in
United States Fidelity And Guaranty Co. v. Holkins, 8 Misc. (2d) 296, 170 N.Y.S. (2d) 441 ( 1957).
And two other recent cases have followed the rule:
Crook v. State Farrn Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 235
S.C. 452, 112 S.E. (2d) 241 (1960); and Carlile
v. Vari, 113 Ohio 233, 177 N.E. (2d) 694 (1961).
In the Carlile case the court said it was following
the majority position.
The defendant, therefore, contends that the
better rule, and the one fallowed by most courts,
is that the insurer is not liable for any interest
other than that which accrues on the judgment for
which it is liable. The various cases cited have interpreted the Standard Interest Clause as being clear
and unambiguous, and have found no detriment
to the insured.
CONCLUSION
A reasonable and fair consideration of the
facts as presented to the trial court at the pre-trial
in support of defendant's Motion For Summary
Judgment leads to the conclusion that the defendant and appellant established its defense of noncooperation by a greater preponderance of the evidence. The facts clearly show that the defendant
was greatly prejudiced in its defense by Chuck
Shim Lew's absence and that the defendant and
appellant had made reasonably diligent efforts within the time allowed by the trial court in the Marie
E. Peterson v. Chuck Shim Lew case, once it was
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known that the insured had left California without
notifying Wes tern as he had been advised he should
do, to locate the insured. The defendant's efforts
did not stop even here. It sought additional time
from the trial court in the action brought by Marie
E. Peterson against Chuck Shim Lew to gain additional time in which to locate Chuck Shim Lew, but
the trial court denied it this additional time - in
effect finding that Chuck Shim Lew had failed to
perform his obligation to keep counsel for Western
and the court informed as to his whereabouts and
had failed to cooperate either with counsel or court
in making himself available for trial.
Even so, the defendant and appellant did not
seek to take any advantage of Chuck Shim Lew's
absence but offered to allow judgment to be taken
for its evaluation of the case in the amount of
$6,000.00 even after the court had refused it a
continuance - again evidencing its efforts to act
in good faith both with reference to its own insured and to those who might have claims against its
insured.
In view of the foregoing the trial court in this
case would appear to have had no alternative but
to grant the defendant's Motion For Summary
Judgment in the absence of any evidence by the
plaintiff that Chuck Shim Lew's non attendance
was excusable and without prejudice or that Western's efforts to locate him were not reasonable. The
plaintiff presented no such evidence whatsoever.
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The trial court erred in yet another respect' \.
in assuming the existence of facts not shown, to- '
wit, that Western had agents located throughout
the country who could in fact have located the insured, Chuck Shim Lew, within the time available
to the defendant and appellant. It is true that under
its contract of insurance the insurer, Western, had
a duty to its insured, Chuck Shim Lew, but by
the same instrument he agreed
"The insured shall cooperate with The Western and, upon The Western's request, attend
hearings and trials and assist in making
settlements, securing and giving evidence, ob- '
taining the attendance of witnesses and in the
conduct of any legal proceedings in connection with the subject matter of this insurance.
The insured shall not, except at his own cost,
voluntarily make any payment, assume any
obligation or incur any expense other than
for such first aid to others as shall be imperative at the time of accident."
We should not lose sight of the fact that an
insurance policy is in essence a contract between
the insurer and its insured and that judgment
creditors, such as the plaintiff in this case, claim
through the insured and should have no greater
rights under the policy than the insured, himself.

1

There appears to be no escape from the conclusion in this case that the insured, Chuck Shim
Lew, failed to comply with his obligation under
the policy and that the defendant and appellant
did everything which it might be reasonably ex36

pected to do to secure his compliance and coopera-

tion.

We, therefore, respectfully submit that the
trial court erred in failing to grant the defendant
and appellant's Motion For Summary Judgment
and in granting such a Motion to the plaintiff; and
respectfully petition this court to reverse the trial
court, vacate the summary judgment and enter a
summary judgment in the defendant's favor.
Respectfully submitted,

HANSON & GARRETT

520 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for
Defendant and Appellant
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